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Death and dying have preoccupied humanity since civilization began. 
While euthanasia is a multidimensional and multicultural ethical issue, the 
tendency has been for all countries to adopt Western definitions, terms 
and conditions which now include many legal prescriptions. My research 
report involves its practice by the Ntomba tribe in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. In this practice, the hereditary Chief, upon 
installation, agrees to the belief that not only natural death takes chief’s 
individual life but his bwanga (energy, vital force) from which the whole 
community’s well-being including animal, vegetal and non-vegetal holds. 
Given importance of community over individual, he accepts to be 
euthanatized by his batwa (pygmies) when his energy has waned. I 
describe this as “autonomy” even if this may be considered “murder” by 
those who do not understand the cultural context.  I will argue that in 
fact, it represents a different perspective and reflect on the possible 
commonalities concerning euthanasia in Ntomba traditional thought and 
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In 2008, in the postgraduate unit Introduction to Bioethics, my class 
particularly enjoyed a guest lecture by Dr. Michael Cloete who presented 
on the topic “African Philosophy”. As part of his presentation, he raised 
many issues e.g., whether there is such a thing as an “African” 
philosophy, the validity or not of oral tradition, the impact of colonialism 
on the African continent and misinterpretations of cultural practices by 
non-indigenous Africans. As a Bantu African, I was intrigued and 
following his lecture and research, I began to investigate and further 
reflect on some of the cultural practices of my tribe, the Ntomba living in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
 
My mother language is French and, although I am fluent in reading and 
comprehension of the English language, my written English is not as fluid 
as it should be. With the guidance of Professor L-J van Bogaert, I was 
successful in publishing an article in Developing World Bioethics titled 
Reflections on Euthanasia: Western and Ntomba Perspectives on the 
Death of a Chief. In what follows, I will set out the framework of my 
deliberation which resulted in the article. 
 
  
African Genesis  
Much of the history of Africa has been dominated by the occupation of 
colonialists from various Western countries. Largely, this resulted in the 
subjugation of the cultural, social and political life of Black indigenous 
Africans during this time.  Although throughout human history other 
lands and peoples have been routinely subjugated by their conquerors,1 
the African experience was unique in that there was little assimilation2 or 
acculturation3                                                             
1 One of the most common benefits of being a conqueror was the taking of slaves.  Slavery 
was common practice in the Roman Empire and continued in Northern Europe during its 
Medieval era only being abolished in the 11th – 12th centuries, but it continued in Southern 
and Eastern Europe into the ‘modern ‘ period (Carey 2009). A more stabilised economy and 
the development of the trade routes before the 1300s found African slaves in Spain, Italy, 
and Southern France. From about the 8th century onwards, an Arab-run slave trade also 
flourished. Much of this infamous slave-trade took place in West Africa, and inlands to East 
Africa downwards. Many African societies as well had forms of slavery, although, Carey 
(ibid) claims “these differed considerably, both from each other and from the European 
and Arabic forms”.  Interestingly, there are still reports on slavery being practiced in Africa 
(see for example: Harter 2004).   
 into the dominant ethno-cultural community. Most likely 
2 Assimilation refers to a process in which members of an ethno-community (a minority in the population (e.g. immigrants) are "absorbed" into the community. In the majority of these cases, some characteristics of the absorbed group loose some characteristics such as language and customs.  
3 Acculturation, according to Kottak (2007: 63) occurs when there is an exchange of cultural features resulting from a continuous contact. The original cultural patterns of either or both communities may change, but the groups remain distinct.   
  
this was due to “race” as well as the level of what was considered African 
“development” by the colonists.  As was the general tenor of the times, 
ideas concerning race and difference were infused into a belief that 
Africans were of inferior intelligence. This, in the colonial mentality, was 
supported by the fact that Africa was largely in fact, colonized.  A 
psychological trait also must be mentioned, for we tend to fear the most 
the things which we do not understand – such as the overt 
manifestations of differences between us e.g. colour, language, and 
rituals attached to belief systems.  African “development” then was 
framed within such notions. 
During this time, at least for the most part, African systems of knowledge 
were largely ignored. With a dominant non-African culture in place, this 
impacted on the ways in which Africans viewed themselves and their 
worlds – should they act “African”, or behave like “an inverted mirror of 
Western Eurocentrism” (Higgs 2003: 6).   
The insights of Zygmunt Bauman (1987: 132) may be useful here.  He coins 
the term “state-administered social universal identity”.  By this he means 
that governmental interventions aim to order populations and 
communities and organise all aspects of their lives, including the                                                                                                                                                              
  
‘language of politics and morality’ (ibid: 137).   Applied to the colonial 
system(s) in Africa, the ‘social’ has boundaries or is of an economic, 
biological, geographical, or political type which requires policing for 
societal order. When interventions are “required” (i.e. into traditions, 
practices which are not understood by the colonists) the imposed social 
order makes governmental interventions appear natural and rational.   
When this type of social order is imposed there are three methods 
Bauman (1997: 42-44) suggests which are used to maintain power: 
assimilation, exclusion, and the physical destruction of people. It is 
generally acknowledged that the colonialists used, to greater or lesser 
degrees, all three during their occupation in various parts of Africa.  At 
the same time, this organised system brought with it some benefits to 
many Africans in terms of education and medical care, but the overall 
alienation  of the African person as being  has had a lasting impact on 
what the African considers as his or her self.   
  
Autonomy and the African Self  
It is a common tendency to take folk ways of thinking and individual 
world-views and classify them only in the most general of terms. 
Following that, the general tendency is to wrongfully apply this 
generalization to many different ways of thinking. For example, in the 
case of African folk ways, world-views, and beliefs, those as diverse as 
those found within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or Kenya, or 
the Sudan all are ascribed as “African”. 4
 
 From the onset, it should be 
noted that objections to views in support of a single all-encompassing 
world-view as “African” should be considered as non-issues.  Only the 
most naïve would deny that there is an enormous amount of cultural 
diversity on the African continent.   
For those outside the African continent, and even those within, 
differences between African cultures may well be perceived as 
incongruous. One reason may be that Africans have not been taught 
much about the different ways of life other Africans experience on the 
continent. This aside, a synoptic picture of communalities in African                                                              4 When speaking of things “African” in this paper, I speak of indigenous Black Africans.    
  
cultures as demonstrated by Bantu scholars (and others) does identify a 
common thread which appears in African world-views and cultures (see 
for example: Wiredu 1980; Shutte 1993; Masolo 2003).   
This is the golden thread of the African interrelatedness with others; he 
or she as being with [the other], as Heidegger (1996: 79) puts it.  This 
interrelatedness in African settings is described by Mbiti (1970: 108) in the 
following way: 
Whatever happens to the individual happens to the 
whole group, and whatever happens to the whole group 
happens to the individual. The individual can only say: “I 
am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am”. 
Within this framework, interrelatedness transcends the immediate 
anthropological space.  A muntu (a human being) is essentially ‘always 
already’ in a dynamic  interdependence with both seen and unseen 
animal and non-animal being with which he or she shares the same 
universe, including flora and fauna. 
Tangwa (1996: 192) describes this relationship as being “Eco-bio-
communitarianism”. By this he means that a human is not like any other 
being in that he or she in known by both Western and non-Western 
cultures as having an awareness of self and the world.  In this view, the 
  
well-being of the human is paramount as it links to a humanistic 
worldview. The concept of one’s well-being and how it is attained cannot 
be considered in isolation from their particular cultural context of the 
emergence of the self. While western cultures value individuality, the 
non-Western regards community as the key to the matrix of self-
determination.  
Perhaps there has been a tendency to minimise the ways in which culture 
feeds into the image of self.  For example, Western philosophers 
generally have been inclined to minimize the contributions of culture and 
assume that the idea of autonomy (as self-rule, self-governance) is 
universal. However in at least in my view of the African self, it is not a 
single entity.  As Taylor (1979: 49) indicates, to frame the world within an 
African’s context of self requires an … 
… adventure of the imagination whereby we abandon this 
image of man whose complex identity is incased within the 
shell of his physical being, and allow ourselves instead to 
visualize a centrifugal selfhood, equally complex 
interpermeating other selves, a relationship in which object 
and subject are no longer distinguishable . 
  
In this perspective, autonomy extends and overlaps with the selves of 
others and in a community environment there is not a great distinction 
between collective and ‘individual’ aims.  In situations where a distinction 
may be necessary, personal goals are subjugated to the good of the 
collective.  In the public self, actions are performed according to the 
expectations of kin, companions and community.   The idea of such a 
collective or group-sharing of autonomy is commonly referred to as 
“Ubuntu”. While there are many interpretations of Ubuntu, behaving 
with humanity is one of its most important components. As a process or 
action, Ubuntu requires the communality of purpose and direction 
recognising both the force of communal decisions as well as its 
fallibilities.   
What is not often recognised by Western ethicists is that the concepts of 
self-rule and self-governance are not consistent throughout our lives.  
Because it cannot be so, we have particular rules for the application of 
this principle of autonomy e.g. children and the infirmed are not 
considered as capable of autonomous decision-taking.   
If I may digress for a moment, a case of a dying patient requesting 
euthanasia5
                                                             
5 An article by Parker (2005: 523-536) provides the details: Euthanasia was legalised in The 
Netherlands in 2001. Australia’s Northern Territory was the world’s first jurisdiction to 
 may be illustrative. It is argued that in many cases, the 
  
decision to choose death is a result of conscious or unconscious 
motivations often deriving from stress, pain, family member despair, etc.   
In such cases, although such factors may in reality have no bearing on the 
patient’s truly autonomous decision, it is still likely to be questioned e.g. 
How much did the pain, family despair, etc. weigh on the patients’ 
decision to be euthanized?  It appears to me that in this type of case, 
autonomy may be seen as a value, rather than a principle as presented in 
a Western ethical perspective. A principle is peremptorily respected while 
the value is not. Moreover, a decision resulting in death is always 
regarded as an interference with the common good when bounded by 
the Western goals of medicine.6
                                                                                                                                                            
legalise euthanasia in 1996, and four people were assisted to die under this legislation 
before it was repealed by the Australian federal government in 1997. Euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide were legalized in Belgium in 2002. Oregon is the only state in the 
US to have legalised physician-assisted suicide, in 1997, despite attempts in other states in 
recent years (California, Washington and Michigan). Switzerland tolerates assisted suicide 
by non-physicians, although physician-assisted suicide (not active euthanasia) has recently 
received restricted approval by the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences. Germany allows 
physician-assisted suicide, but not active euthanasia. Colombia legalised euthanasia in 
1997, although the implementation of guidelines is incomplete, and Uruguay’s criminal 
code allows mercy killing to go unpunished under certain conditions. Parliamentary bills 
have been presented to the legislatures of South Australia, New South Wales, Western 
Australia, Luxembourg and New Zealand. The UK House of Lords has recently considered a 
bill to allow euthanasia, which is likely to be reintroduced into the new parliament. Two of 
the UK’s Royal Medical Colleges dropped their opposition to this bill while the British 
Medical Association has also just adopted a neutral stance. 
  The agreement to die arrived upon by 
an individual emanating from a community culture and consensus may be 
6 According to an article by the Hastings Center Project report (1996) The goals of medicine are: 1) the prevention of disease and injury and the promotion and maintenance of health, 2) the relief of pain and suffering caused by maladies, 3) the care and cure of those with a malady, and the care of those who cannot be cured, and, 4) the avoidance of premature death and the pursuit of a peaceful death.  
  
considered a wrongful or bad death.  However ‘life’ is not owned in many 
non-Western cultures. In this way, discussions concerning an individual’s 
right to die have no application except for those in which compassion is 
the motivating factor.  p’Bitek (1964: 32) claims 
 The White man has identified the mind with the brain and has 
imprisoned the self within the skull. The African has his own.  
An interpretation of p’Bitek may point us to the recognition that the 
Other is not just a form which is almost the-same-as-mine-but- not-
quite. Rather, he calls for an unequivocal acceptance of the 









Concluding remarks  
“Tradition” and “traditional” are two of the most frequently used and 
misunderstood terms connected with the study of culture and society 
(Shils 1971: 123). They are typically referred to as descriptions or 
explanations in which they repeat in almost identifiable form as societal 
norms, structures of conduct, or patterns of beliefs over several 
generations of relationships over time.  
In his book, Gyekye (1997) identifies that traditions are handed down 
from one generation to another to do with as that particular generation 
deems fit. For example, a generation my reject the tradition fully, keep 
some but not all of it, or continue with it as it is. After four generations of 
the same application, the practice becomes a part of the current culture- 
a tradition. This of course relates to the fact that all cultures change over 
time. Some cultures change faster than others, but change is a co-
relevant of culture. Normally, the practice of a tradition occurs within a 
single genetically continuous population living in a demarcated 
geographical region. The groups involved are identifiable to the extent 
that they share other common traditions, or in demonstrable ways, a 
common culture. Since morality is a characteristic of human beings 
embedded in social relationships, all attempts to understand e. g. 
symbolic language and orality are rooted in assumptions about human 
actions and the nature of society even if the holders are unaware of their 
own beliefs (Tonkin 1986: 213).  Unaware or not, no culture has the 
monopoly on ethical validity and end the end, what is required of all 
humans is mutual respect and recognition of difference.  
  
The basic question put to all those reflecting on ethical behaviour are: 
Who is harmed; who is helped?  I will leave the reader to decide as I now 
turn to my article.  
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